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Abstract
We produce a decidable classical normal modal logic of internalised
negation-complete and thus disjunctive non-monotonic interactive proofs
(LDiiP) from an existing logical counterpart of non-monotonic or instant
interactive proofs (LiiP). LDiiP internalises agent-centric proof theories
that are negation-complete (maximal) and consistent (and hence strictly
weaker than, for example, Peano Arithmetic) and enjoy the disjunction
property (like Intuitionistic Logic). In other words, internalised proof the-
ories are ultrafilters and all internalised proof goals are definite in the sense
of being either provable or disprovable to an agent by means of disjunc-
tive internalised proofs (thus also called epistemic deciders). Still, LDiiP
itself is classical (monotonic, non-constructive), negation-incomplete, and
does not have the disjunction property. The price to pay for the nega-
tion completeness of our interactive proofs is their non-monotonicity and
non-communality (for singleton agent communities only). As a normal
modal logic, LDiiP enjoys a standard Kripke-semantics, which we justify
by invoking the Axiom of Choice on LiiP’s and then construct in terms of
a concrete oracle-computable function. LDiiP’s agent-centric internalised
notion of proof can also be viewed as a negation-complete disjunctive ex-
plicit refinement of standard KD45-belief, and yields a disjunctive but
negation-incomplete explicit refinement of S4-provability.
Keywords: agents as proof checkers, constructive Kripke-semantics, dis-
junctive explicit doxastic & epistemic logic, epistemic deciders as decisive
evidence, interactive & oracle computation, multi-agent systems, negation
as failure, proofs as sufficient evidence, proof terms as truth values.
1 Introduction
The subject matter of this paper is classical normal modal logic of non-monotonic
interactive proofs, i.e., a novel modal logic of negation-complete and thus dis-
∗Work partially funded with Grant AFR 894328 from the National Research Fund Luxem-
bourg cofunded under the Marie-Curie Actions of the European Commission (FP7-COFUND).
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junctive interactive proofs (LDiiP) and an existing modal logic of non-disjunctive
and thus negation-incomplete interactive proofs (LiiP) [Kra13, Kra12c]. (We
abbreviate interactivity-related adjectives with lower-case letters.)
Our goal here is to produce LDiiP axiomatically as well as semantically
from LiiP. Note that like in [Kra13, Kra12c, Kra12a], we still understand in-
teractive proofs as sufficient evidence for intended resource-unbounded proof-
checking agents (who are though unable to guess), and leave probabilistic and
polynomial-time resource bounds for future work.
1.1 Motivation
Our immediate motivation for LDiiP is first the theoretical concept and second
the practical application of a negation-complete variant of our interactive proofs
[Kra13, Kra12c, Kra12a]. The overarching motivation for LDiiP is to serve
in an intuitionistic foundation of interactive computation. See [Kra12a] for a
programmatic motivation.
1.1.1 Theoretical concept
Like in the non-interactive setting of a single prover-verifier agent, the motiva-
tion for negation-complete (maximal) and consistent logical theories (or ultra-
filters [DP02]) and their external and internalised notions of proof is to gain
cognitive, constructive, and computational content.
Recall that a logical theory T is negation-complete by definition if and only
if (written “:iff” hereafter) for all formulas φ in the language (say L) of T, φ ∈ T
or ¬φ ∈ T, and that T is consistent :iff ⊥ 6∈ T (so T 6= L), where ‘¬’ desig-
nates negation (complementation) and ⊥ falsehood (bottom). Notice that each
such logical theory (a filter1 of propositions) is defined in terms of a characteris-
tic property and thus independently of how it is generated (e.g., based on some
proof system or satisfaction relation), and that inconsistent theories are trivially
negation-complete as well as classical. Classic examples of non-trivial negation-
complete (first-order) theories (with equality, but without sets) are: Tarski’s
fragment of Euclidean Geometry, Presburger (natural-number) Arithmetic, and
elementary real-number arithmetic. Given a recursive axiomatisation2 of and
thus an external notion of proof for T, negation completeness and consistency
corresponds to the meta-theorem schema `T φ or `T ¬φ (NC) and 6`T ⊥ ,
respectively. That is, for all φ ∈ L, φ or ¬φ is a theorem of T, or, model-
theoretically speaking, a validity, i.e., a universal truth. For negation-complete
consistent modal theories, this incidentally means that there is no local truth
that is not also a global truth, and thus the point of their modality (which is
non-trivial local truth, i.e., truth in some but not all of their pointed models) is
nullified. (If `T φ then φ is a universal and thus global truth; if 6`T φ then `T ¬φ
1A subset in a (logical) lattice is a filter by definition if and only if it is closed under meet
(conjunction) and the lattice ordering (implication) [DP02, Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra].
2I.e., T has an algorithmically decidable set of axioms. This is a minimal requirement for
any practical logical theory; it guarantees the recognizability of its axioms.
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by the negation completeness of T, and thus ¬φ is a universal and thus global
truth, and hence φ cannot be a local truth by the consistency of T.) So in some
sense, negation-complete modal theories are trivial, even if they are consistent.
Fortunately here, our modal LDiiP is negation-incomplete. It is only the no-
tion of proof that LDiiP internalises that is negation-complete. Compared with
LDiiP’s internalised agent-centric notion of proof, negation completeness and
consistency corresponds to the axiom schema `LDiiP (M Ya φ)∨ (M Ya ¬φ) and
`LDiiP ¬(M Ya⊥), respectively, where M designates a proof (message) and a an
intended proof-checking agent. Notice how meta-logical negation and disjunc-
tion internalise as their object-logical counterparts. Also, observe that our in-
ternalisation is more concrete than its external counterpart in the sense that the
first speaks about a concrete (internalised) proof (sufficient evidence)M whereas
the latter only speaks about an abstract (external) provability `T. Negation
completeness means that M represents sufficient data (e.g., a completion of the
local system history recorded as a log file) for deciding whether some statement
(e.g., about the current system state given by the global history) is true or false.
Hilbert hoped for a negation-complete consistent theory for the whole of math-
ematics, because, in his word, there is no ignorabimus in negation-complete
consistent theories; in some sense, they are cognitively ideal: All (internalised)
proof goals are definite [Mos06], here in the sense that their truth or falsehood
can be determined unambiguously (and here even effectively by an agent) by
means of (internalised) proofs (thus also called epistemic deciders). Moreover,
negation-complete theories, though necessarily non-intuitionistic (!), neverthe-
less enjoy the disjunction property of Intuitionistic Logic (IL),3 which is that
if `IL φ ∨ φ′ then `IL φ or `IL φ′ (DP) [TvD88]. Thus they have considerable
constructive content, and this even by conserving the deductive convenience of
the law of the excluded middle! To see why negation-complete theories are nec-
essarily classical, suppose that there is a non-classical negation-complete theory
T (i.e., 6`T φ ∨ ¬φ, and `T φ or `T ¬φ) and derive an immediate contradiction
therefrom by considering the law of right and left ∨-introduction (set φ′ := ¬φ),
which asserts that if `T φ or `T φ′ then `T φ ∨ φ′ (and is also valid in IL). In
fact, for classical logical theories, negation completeness is classically equivalent
to the disjunction property. This is a well-known result, which we recall here.
Theorem 1. For classical logical theories (filters in Boolean algebras or lat-
tices), negation completeness (maximality or being an ultrafilter) is classically
equivalent to the disjunction property (the property of being a prime filter).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Internalising negation-complete proof theories, LDiiP thus internalises their dis-
junction property, as the theorem schema `LDiiP (M Ya (φ∨φ′))→ ((M Ya φ)∨
(M Ya φ′)), which is why we call our internalised proofs also disjunctive. Yet
given first, the classicality (and normality) of LDiiP, and second, Theorem 1,
3See [CZ91] for a survey of other, so-called super-intuitionistic or intermediate logics
strictly below classical propositional logic that also enjoy the disjunction property.
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which applies to the theories that LDiiP internalises, we could as well have stip-
ulated the internalised disjunction property as axiom schema and then derived
the internalised negation completeness therefrom as theorem schema. That is,
in arbitrary classical normal modal logics, we can make the following deduction,
where the universal meta-quantification over φ and φ′ in Line 1 is left implicit:
1. ` (φ ∨ φ′)→ (φ ∨φ′) assumed internalised disjunction property
2. ` (φ ∨ ¬φ)→ (φ ∨¬φ) 1, particularisation (set φ′ := ¬φ)
3. ` φ ∨ ¬φ classical tautology
4. ` (φ ∨ ¬φ) 3, necessitation (normality)
5. ` φ ∨¬φ 2, 4, modus ponens. (internalised negation completeness)
To see also the computational content in negation-complete consistent theo-
ries with a recursive axiomatisation as previously claimed, recall from classical
recursion theory [LdR04] that such theories are actually also recursive (algo-
rithmically decidable) as a whole, i.e., not only in their set of axioms: The
recursiveness of the axioms of a theory implies the recursive enumerability of its
theorems. So in order to decide whether or not φ ∈ T for a given φ ∈ L in the
language L of such a theory T, start the enumeration process of the members
of T. By the negation completeness of T, either φ or ¬φ will pop up in the
process. If φ pops up then stop, and conclude that φ ∈ T; if ¬φ pops up then
stop, and conclude that φ 6∈ T by the consistency of T.
In summary, the cognitive, constructive, and computational content of re-
cursively axiomatised negation-complete consistent theories is distilled in their
maximal consistency, disjunction property, and algorithmic decidability, respec-
tively. However, their scope is far from the one of Hilbert’s hope: Go¨del as-
certained the negation-incompleteness of any recursively axiomatised consis-
tent theory containing the Peano-Arithmetic (PA) part of mathematics [LdR04,
Fit07b].4 Worse, consistent theories containing PA are also algorithmically un-
decidable [LdR04]. Notwithstanding, recursively axiomatised negation-complete
consistent theories, which are thus strictly weaker than PA, are crucial for prac-
tical applications. (Maximally consistent sets are also crucial for theoretical
applications such as the canonical-model construction for axiomatic complete-
ness proofs, cf. Appendix A.4.2.)
1.1.2 Practical application
Both the external as well as the internalised form of negation completeness
have important practical applications. Important practical applications of the
external form “` φ or ` ¬φ ” of negation completeness, which have become
4Although the natural numbers form a strict subset of the real numbers, the negation-
incomplete PA cannot be a subset of the negation-complete elementary real-number arithmetic
(R) mentioned earlier; the natural numbers are not definable in the language of R [Fra05].
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classics in computer science and engineering, are logic databases and program-
ming. There, the external form “` φ or ` ¬φ ” classically corresponds to the
principle of negation as failure “ 6` φ implies ` ¬φ ”, i.e., ¬φ can be inferred
if every possible proof of φ fails [Cla78, Rei78]. Another important practical
application of a modal-logical variant “ 6` Ka(φ) implies ` ¬Ka(φ) ” of negation
as failure is artificial intelligence [Par91], where Ka(φ) reads as “agent a knows
that φ (is true).” There, this epistemic variant of negation as failure produces a
non-monotonic logic of knowledge for multi-agent distributed systems. (This is
also the only piece of related work that we are aware of.) An important practi-
cal application of our internalised form `LDiiP (M Ya φ) ∨M Ya ¬φ of negation
completeness is accountability for dependable multi-agent distributed systems
(e.g., electronic voting systems [KR11], and, more generally, the whole Internet
[Lan09]). A multi-agent distributed system S is accountable by definition if
and only if S is abuse-free and auditable [KR10]: For all agents b in S, (abuse-
freeness), whenever b behaves correctly (as an agent in S), b can prove to all
agents a (including to herself) in S that she does so, and, (auditability), when-
ever b behaves incorrectly (and thus is faulty), every or at least one other agent c
in S will eventually be able to prove to all agents a in S (including to herself and
b) that b is faulty, (cf. [KR10] for a formal transcription of this natural-language
formulation). In such a system S, each agent b’s behaviour in terms of her past
actions can be recorded in a log file [Chu09] (say M) that is broadcast; and it
is this log file M that must be constructed so as to have sufficient evidential
strength to constitute a negation-complete proof with respect to the proof goal
of b behaving correctly (expressed with an atomic formula correct(b)):
(M Ya correct(b)) ∨M Ya ¬ correct(b)
In other words, M must constitute decisive evidence or, in yet other words, be
an epistemic decider to a about the (ephemeral) issue of b’s correctness. (b can
change her behaviour!) That is, LDiiP is a formal theory of epistemic deciders.
For abuse-freeness (auditability), the prover b (c) must (eventually) know such
an M , written b kM (c kM). We will present formal definitions in Section 2
and a full formal case study in future work (cf. [KR10] for a preliminary, non-
axiomatic accountability case study). Finally, note that a piece of decisive
evidence M for correct(b) brought to the attention of a judge a can be viewed as
a kind of forensic trace, since M allows a to decide whether or not b is correct
and thus to decide whether or not b is guilty of behaving incorrectly.
1.2 Contribution
Conceptual contributions Our conceptual contributions in this paper are
the following. First, we produce a novel modal logic of negation-complete and
thus disjunctive interactive proofs (cf. Theorem 3), which internalises agent-
centric negation-complete consistent proof theories (enjoying the disjunction
property) and has important theoretical and practical applications. Second, we
offer the insights that the price to pay for negation completeness and disjunctive-
ness is the non-monotonicity and non-communality of the resulting agent-centric
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notion of proof (cf. Fact 1 and 5, respectively), which turns out to be also a
negation-complete disjunctive explicit refinement of standard KD45-belief (cf.
Corollary 2). Third, we contribute a disjunctive but negation-incomplete ex-
plicit refinement of S4-provability (cf. Corollary 3), constructed from our notion
of proof.
Technical contributions Our technical contributions are the following. First,
we provide a standard but also oracle-computational and set-theoretically con-
structive Kripke-semantics for LDiiP (cf. Section 2.2). Like in [Kra13, Kra12c],
we endow the proof modality with a standard Kripke-semantics [BvB07], but
whose accessibility relation MRa we first define constructively in terms of el-
ementary set-theoretic constructions,5 namely as MRa, and then match to an
abstract semantic interface in standard form (which abstractly stipulates the
characteristic properties of the accessibility relation [Fit07a]). We will say that
MRa exemplifies (or realises) MRa. (A simple example of a set-theoretically
constructive but non-intuitionistic definition of a modal accessibility is the well-
known definition of epistemic accessibility as state indistinguishability defined
in terms of equality of state projections [FHMV95].) The Kripke-semantics for
LDiiP is oracle-computational in the sense that (cf. Definition 3) the individual
proof knowledge (say M) can be thought of as being provided by an imaginary
computation oracle, which thus acts as a hypothetical provider and imaginary
epistemic source of our interactive proofs. Second, we prove Theorem 2, which
establishes the proof-terms-as-truth-values view as well as a normal form for the
special case of a singleton agent universe. Third, we prove the finite-model prop-
erty (cf. Theorem 4) and the algorithmic decidability of LDiiP (cf. Corollary 4).
(Negation completeness implies algorithmic decidability as seen in Section 1.1.1,
but not vice versa as LDiiP testifies.)
1.3 Roadmap
In the next section, we introduce our Logic of Disjunctive instant interactive
Proofs (LDiiP) axiomatically by means of a compact closure operator that in-
duces the Hilbert-style proof system that we seek. We then gain the (syntactic)
insight that negation completeness implies non-monotonicity (cf. Fact 1), and
prove the above-mentioned Theorem 2 as well as Corollary 2 and 3 within the
obtained system. Next, we introduce the concretely constructed semantics as
well as the standard abstract semantic interface for LDiiP (cf. Section 2.2), and
prove the axiomatic adequacy of the proof system with respect to this inter-
face (cf. Theorem 3). We justify the existence of the constructive semantics of
LDiiP by invoking the Axiom of Choice on LiiP’s (cf. Table 1) and then also con-
struct it in terms of a concrete oracle-computable function, from which we gain
the (semantic) insight that negation completeness implies non-communality (cf.
5in loose analogy with the set-theoretically constructive rather than the purely axiomatic
definition of numbers [Fef89] of ordered pairs (e.g., the now standard definition by Kuratowski,
and other well-known definitions [Mos06])
6
Fact 5). Last but not least, we prove the finite-model property (cf. Theorem 4)
and, therefrom, the algorithmic decidability (cf. Corollary 4) of LDiiP.
2 LDiiP
2.1 Syntactically
Like the Logic of instant interactive Proofs (LiiP), the Logic of Disjunctive
instant interactive Proofs (LDiiP) provides a modal formula language over a
generic message term language. The formula language of LDiiP offers the propo-
sitional constructors, a relational symbol ‘ k ’ for constructing atomic proposi-
tions about individual knowledge (e.g., a kM), and a modal constructor ‘Ya ’
for propositions about proofs (e.g., M Ya φ). In brief, LDiiP is a minimal exten-
sion of classical propositional logic with an interactively generalised additional
operator (the proof modality) and proof-term language. Note, the language of
LDiiP is identical to the one of LiiP [Kra13, Kra12c] modulo the proof-modality
notation, which in LiiP is ‘ ::Ca ’, where a acts as proof checker, like in LDiiP,
and C as a’s peer group, unlike in LDiiP (non-communality).
Definition 1 (The language of LDiiP). Let
• A 6= ∅ designate a non-empty finite set of agent names a, b, c, etc.
• M designate a language of message terms M such that a ∈M
• P designate a denumerable set of propositional variables P constrained
such that for all a ∈ A and M ∈ M, (a kM) ∈ P (for “a knows M”) is a
distinguished variable, i.e., an atomic proposition, (for individual knowl-
edge)
(So, for a ∈ A, a k · is a unary relational symbol.)
• L 3 φ ::= P ∣∣ ¬φ ∣∣ φ ∧ φ ∣∣ M Ya φ designate our language of logical
formulas φ, where M Ya φ reads “M can disjunctively prove that φ to a”
in the sense that “M can prove whether or not φ (is true) to a.”
Note the following macro-definitions: > := aYa a k a, ⊥ := ¬>, φ ∨ φ′ :=
¬(¬φ ∧ ¬φ′), φ→ φ′ := ¬φ ∨ φ′, and φ↔ φ′ := (φ→ φ′) ∧ (φ′ → φ).
Then, LDiiP has the following axiom and deduction-rule schemas, where
grey-shading indicates the remaining essential differences to LiiP [Kra13, Kra12c].
Definition 2 (The axioms and deduction rules of LDiiP). Let
• Γ0 designate an adequate set of axioms for classical propositional logic
• Γ1 designate some appropriate set of axioms for a kM
• Γ2 := Γ0 ∪ Γ1 ∪ {
– M Ya a kM (self-knowledge)
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– (M Ya (φ→ φ′))→ ((M Ya φ)→M Ya φ′) (Kripke’s law, K)
– (M Ya φ)→ (a kM → φ) (epistemic truthfulness)
– ¬(M Ya⊥) (proof consistency)
– (M Ya φ) ∨M Ya ¬φ (negation completeness) }
designate the axiom schemas of LDiiP.
Then, LDiiP := Cl(∅) := ⋃n∈N Cln(∅), where for all Γ ⊆ L:
Cl0(Γ) := Γ2 ∪ Γ
Cln+1(Γ) := Cln(Γ) ∪
{ φ′ | {φ, φ→ φ′} ⊆ Cln(Γ) } ∪ (modus ponens, MP)
{ M Ya φ | φ ∈ Cln(Γ) } ∪ (necessitation, N).
We call LDiiP a base theory, and Cl(Γ) an LDiiP-theory for any Γ ⊆ L.
Notice the logical order of LDiiP, which like LiiP’s is, due to propositions about
(proofs of) propositions, higher-order propositional. From LiiP [Kra13, Kra12c],
we recall the discussions of Kripke’s law (K), the law of epistemic truthfulness,
and the law of necessitation (N): The key to the validity of K is that we under-
stand interactive proofs as sufficient evidence for intended resource-unbounded
proof-checking agents (who are though still unable to guess). Clearly for such
agents, if M is sufficient evidence for φ→ φ′ and φ then so is M for φ′. Then, the
significance of epistemic truthfulness to interactivity is that in truly distributed
multi-agent systems, not all proofs are known by all agents, i.e., agents are not
omniscient with respect to messages. Otherwise, why communicate with each
other? So there being a proof does not imply knowledge of that proof. When an
agent a does not know the proof and the agent cannot generate the proof ex ni-
hilo herself by guessing it, only communication from a peer, who thus acts as an
oracle, can entail the knowledge of the proof with a. Next, the justification for
N is that in interactive settings, validities, and thus a fortiori tautologies (in the
strict sense of validities of the propositional fragment), are in some sense trivi-
alities [Kra12a]. To see why, recall that modal validities are true in all pointed
models (cf. Definition 5), and thus not worth being communicated from one
point to another in a given model, e.g., by means of specific interactive proofs.
(Nothing is logically more embarrassing than talking in tautologies.) There-
fore, validities deserve arbitrary proofs. What is worth being communicated
are truths weaker than validities, namely local truths in the standard model-
theoretic sense (cf. Definition 5), which may not hold universally. Otherwise
why communicate with each other? We continue to discuss the remaining, new
axioms and rules. As mentioned, the message language M of LDiiP is generic,
and thus a kM will require axioms that are appropriate to the term structure
of the chosen M ∈ M (such as those required for LiiP [Kra13, Kra12c]). The
validity of the axiom schema of self-knowledge is justified by oracle computa-
tion: “if a were to receive M , e.g., from an oracle, then a would know M”
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(cf. Definition 3). (The law of self-knowledge is also valid in LiiP, where it
corresponds to the theorem [but not axiom] schema M ::∅a a kM .) The axiom
schema of proof consistency and negation completeness internalises (external
theory) consistency and negation completeness, respectively (cf. Section 1.1.1).
Observe that internalised negation completeness is defined independently of the
proof-term structure (M is abstract), just as (external) negation completeness of
a logical theory is defined independently of its possible proof-system structure.
However, this abstract definition is an indirect, structural constraint: after all,
not any proof-system structure generates a negation-complete theory.
Proposition 1 (Hilbert-style proof system). Let
• Φ `LDiiP φ :iff if Φ ⊆ LDiiP then φ ∈ LDiiP
• φ a`LDiiP φ′ :iff {φ} `LDiiP φ′ and {φ′} `LDiiP φ
• `LDiiP φ :iff ∅ `LDiiP φ.
In other words, `LDiiP ⊆ 2L × L is a system of closure conditions in the sense
of [Tay99, Definition 3.7.4]. For example:
1. for all axioms φ ∈ Γ2, `LDiiP φ
2. for modus ponens, {φ, φ→ φ′} `LDiiP φ′
3. for necessitation, {φ} `LDiiP M Ya φ.
(In the space-saving, horizontal Hilbert-notation “Φ `LDiiP φ”, Φ is not a set
of hypotheses but a set of premises, cf. modus ponens and necessitation.) Then
`LDiiP can be viewed as being defined by a Cl-induced Hilbert-style proof system.
In fact Cl : 2L → 2L is a standard consequence operator, i.e., a substitution-
invariant compact closure operator.
Proof. Like in [Kra12a]. That a Hilbert-style proof system can be viewed as
induced by a compact closure operator is well-known (e.g., see [Gab95]); that
Cl is indeed such an operator can be verified by inspection of the inductive
definition of Cl; and substitution invariance follows from our definitional use of
axiom schemas.6
Corollary 1 (Normality). LDiiP is a normal modal logic.
Proof. Jointly by Kripke’s law, modus ponens, necessitation (these by defini-
tion), and substitution invariance (cf. Proposition 1).
Note that in LDiiP, an analog of the primitive LiiP-rule
{a kM ↔ a kM ′} `LiiP (M ′ ::Ca φ)↔M ::Ca φ (see [Kra13, Kra12c])
6Alternatively to axiom schemas, we could have used axioms together with an additional
substitution-rule set { σ[φ] | φ ∈ Cln(Γ) } in the definiens of Cln+1(Γ).
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would be invalid (because incompatible with negation completeness) and thus is
not admitted in LDiiP. A fortiori, an analog of the stronger primitive LiP-rule
{a kM → a kM ′} `LiP (M ′ :Ca φ)→M :Ca φ (see [Kra13, Kra12a])
by which proof monotonicity `LiP (M :Ca φ) → (M,M ′) :Ca φ under paired data
M ′ can be deduced, would be invalid and thus is not admitted in LDiiP either.
We thus assert the following negative fact about our negation-complete proofs.
Fact 1. Negation completeness implies non-monotonicity.
Note that if we introduced a pairing constructor for proof terms into the message
language M of LDiiP (as with LiiP, cf. Table 1), Fact 1 would mean that
6`LDiiP (M Ya φ)→ (M,M ′)Ya φ .
Fact 2.
1. {φ→ φ′} `LDiiP (M Ya φ)→M Ya φ′ (regularity)
2. `LDiiP ¬(M Ya⊥)↔ ((M Ya φ)→ ¬(M Ya ¬φ))
3. `LDiiP (M Ya ¬φ)↔M Ya (φ→ ⊥)
Proof. 1 and 2 are well-known for necessity modalities in arbitrary normal modal
logics. For 3, consider that `LDiiP ¬φ ↔ (φ → ⊥) since ¬φ ↔ (φ → ⊥) is a
classical tautology, and then deduce the conclusion by 1.
Lemma 1.
1. `LDiiP M Ya ((M Ya φ)→ φ) (self-proof of truthfulness)
2. `LDiiP (M Ya (M Ya φ))→M Ya φ (proof density)
Proof. See Appendix A.2
The laws of self-proof of truthfulness and proof density also hold in LiiP [Kra13,
Kra12c]. We continue to present the first important result about LDiiP.
Theorem 2 (Proof terms as Truth values).
1. `LDiiP (M Ya ¬φ)↔ ¬(M Ya φ) (maximal consistency)
2. `LDiiP (M Ya (φ ∧ φ′))↔ ((M Ya φ) ∧M Ya φ′) (proof conjunctions bis)
3. `LDiiP (M Ya (φ ∨ φ′))↔ ((M Ya φ) ∨M Ya φ′) (IDP bis)
4. `LDiiP (M Ya (φ→ φ′))↔ ((M Ya φ)→M Ya φ′) (K bis)
5. `LDiiP (M Ya (φ↔ φ′))↔ ((M Ya φ)↔M Ya φ′) (Bi-K)
6. `LDiiP (M Ya (M Ya φ))↔M Ya φ (modal idempotency)
7. `LDiiP b kM → ((M Yb (M Ya φ))↔M Ya φ) (modal idempotency bis)
10
Proof. See Appendix A.3
“IDP” abbreviates “Internalised Disjunction Property.” The laws are enumer-
ated in a (total) order that respects their respective proof prerequisites. Notice
that Theorem 2.2–2.5 are modal distributivity laws. They assert that the proof
modality of LDiiP is fully distributive over (binary) Boolean operators. While
the laws of proof conjunction bis and modal idempotency also hold in LiiP
[Kra13, Kra12c], only the if-direction of the laws IDP bis and K bis hold in LiiP.
Notice also that modal idempotency combines proof density (cf. Lemma 1.2)
and proof transitivity (cf. Line l of the proof of modal idempotency). Like in
LiiP and LiP, the key to the validity of modal idempotency is that each agent
(e.g., a) can act herself as proof checker, see [Kra12a, Section 3.2.2] for more
details. The law of modal idempotency bis is a generalisation of modal idem-
potency. Observe that when |A| = 1, Theorem 2 implies that all occurrences
of the proof modality in a compound LDiiP-formula can be compiled away in
the sense that all these occurrences can be pushed in front of possibly negated
atomic sub-formulas (i.e., literals) of the compound formula, with the axiom
formula M Ya a kM acting as base case. Hence in this case, we can understand
proof terms as truth-values in the spirit of a form of realizability interpretation
of constructive logic [Tro98, Section 7.8]. Otherwise, i.e., when |A| > 1 (recall
from Definition 1 that A 6= ∅), it is possible that not all such occurrences in a
compound formula can be compiled away (cf. Theorem 2.7).
The following corollary asserts that our negation-complete and thus disjunc-
tive proof modality is also an explicit refinement of the standard (implicit) belief
modality [MV07].
Corollary 2 (Negation-complete Disjunctive Explicit Belief). ‘M Ya ·’ is a
negation-complete disjunctive KD45-modality of explicit agent belief, where M
represents the explicit evidence term that can justify agent a’s belief.
Proof. Consider that ‘M Ya ·’ satisfies Kripke’s law (K, cf. Definition 2), the D-
law (called “proof consistency” in Definition 2), the 4-law (cf. the only-if part
of Theorem 2.6), necessitation (cf. Definition 2), and negation completeness (cf.
Definition 2), and thus the internalised disjunction property (cf. the if-part of
Theorem 2.3). That ‘M Ya ·’ also satisfies the 5-law can be proved as follows:
1. `LDiiP ¬(M Ya φ)→ (M Ya ¬φ) only-if-part of Theorem 2.1
2. `LDiiP (M Ya ¬φ)→M Ya (M Ya ¬φ) only-if-part of Theorem 2.6[¬φ]
3. `LDiiP ¬(M Ya φ)→M Ya (M Ya ¬φ) 1, 2, transitivity of →
4. `LDiiP (M Ya ¬φ)→ ¬(M Ya φ) if-part of Theorem 2.1
5. `LDiiP (M Ya (M Ya ¬φ))→M Ya ¬(M Ya φ) 4, regularity
6. `LDiiP ¬(M Ya φ)→M Ya ¬(M Ya φ) 3, 5, transitivity of →.
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Thanks to epistemic truthfulness, a kM is a sufficient condition for ‘M Ya ·’
to behave like a standard S5-knowledge modality [MV07, FHMV95, HR10],
which not only obeys the D-law but also the stronger T-law, in the sense that
`LDiiP a kM → ((M Ya φ)→ φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
T-law
).
In the following corollary, we construct also a disjunctive but negation-
incomplete explicit refinement of (implicit) S4-provability.
Corollary 3 (Disjunctive Explicit Provability). ‘a kM ∧M Ya ·’ is a disjunc-
tive but negation-incomplete S4-modality of explicit agent provability, where M
represents the explicit evidence term that does justify agent a’s knowledge.
Proof. By Corollary 2 and the fact that the truth law `LDiiP (a kM∧M Ya φ)→
φ for the modality ‘a kM ∧M Ya ·’ is equivalent to the law of epistemic truth-
fulness (cf. Definition 2). Note that although the modality ‘a kM ∧M Ya ·’ is
evidently disjunctive, i.e., `LDiiP (a kM ∧M Ya (φ∨φ′))→ ((a kM ∧M Ya φ)∨
(a kM ∧M Ya φ′)), it is negation-incomplete in that 6`LDiiP (a kM ∧M Ya φ) ∨
(a kM ∧M Ya ¬φ), because 6`LDiiP a kM , in turn because of the arbitrariness
of Γ1 (cf. Definition 2). Fixing Γ1 so that a resource-unbounded agent a unable
to guess knows all messages M could only make sense for A = {a}. Otherwise,
i.e., when all agents know all messages, why interact with each other?
2.2 Semantically
We continue to present the concretely constructed semantics as well as the stan-
dard abstract semantic interface for LDiiP, and prove the axiomatic adequacy
of the proof system with respect to this interface. We justify the existence
of the constructive semantics of LDiiP by invoking the Axiom of Choice on
LiiP’s [Kra13, Kra12c] and then also construct it in terms of a concrete oracle-
computable function.
2.2.1 Concretely
The ingredients for the concrete semantics of LiiP, from which we will construct
the concrete semantics of LDiiP, are displayed in Table 1. Therefrom, we will
only need a concrete instance of S and msgsa, and an abstract instance of clsa as
ingredients for LDiiP. Observe there that the concrete accessibility MR
C
a of LiiP
is a totally defined proper (non-functional) relation. Yet we do need a concrete
accessibility relation for LDiiP that is functional, because LDiiP’s negation-
completeness axiom corresponds to the functionality property of such a relation.
(LDiiP’s proof consistency axiom corresponds to the totality property of such a
relation.) Fortunately, the concrete accessibility MR
C
a of LiiP is totally defined,
and so we know by the Axiom of Choice AC[MR
C
a ], which we may thus apply to
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MR
C
a , that MR
C
a can be “functionalised,” that is [Mos06],
for all s ∈ S, there is s′ ∈ S such that s MRCa s′︸ ︷︷ ︸
MR
C
a is totally defined
implies
there is f : S → S such that for all s ∈ S, s MRCa f(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MR
C
a can be “functionalised”
. (AC[MR
C
a ])
Notice that the Axiom of Choice is non-constructive in that it abstractly asserts
the conditional existence of a certain f but without actually providing a concrete
example of such an f . Thus our problem now is to find such an f for MR
C
a ,
which will allow us to construct a functional concrete accessibility for LDiiP. In
Definition 3, we construct such an f as an oracle-computational function σMa on
concrete states constructed inductively in terms of certain generalised successor
functions. The essential differences in Definition 3 to Table 1 are grey-shaded.
Definition 3 (Semantic ingredients). For the set-theoretically constructive,
model-theoretic study of LDiiP let
• S 3 s ::= 0 ∣∣ succMa (s) , where 0 can be understood as a zero data point
(representing an initial state for example), and succMa can be read as
“agent a receives message M (for example from another agent acting as
an oracle)”
• msgsa : S → 2M be such that
msgsa(0) := ∅
msgsa(succ
M
b (s)) :=
{
msgsa(s) ∪ {M} if a = b, and
msgsa(s) otherwise
• cla : 2M → 2M designate a compact closure operator and define clsa :
2M → 2M such that clsa(D) := cla(msgsa(s) ∪ D) :=
⋃
n∈N cl
n
a(msgsa(s) ∪
D)
• σMa : S → S be so that σMa (s) :=
{
s if M ∈ clsa(∅), and
succMa (s) otherwise (oracle input)
• MRa ⊆ S×S designate a concretely constructed accessibility relation—
short, concrete accessibility—for the negation-complete disjunctive proof
modality such that for all s, s′ ∈ S,
s MRa s
′ :iff s′ = σMa (s).
Fact 3.
1. σMa (and thus MRa) is oracle-computable.
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Table 1: Semantic ingredients for LiiP [Kra13, Kra12c] (partially reused here
for LDiiP)
Let
• S 3 s designate the state space—a set of system states s
• msgsa : S → 2M designate a raw-data extractor that extracts (without
analysing) the (finite) set of messages from a system state s that agent a ∈
A has either generated (assuming that only a can generate a’s signature)
or else received as such (not only as a strict subterm of another message);
that is, msgsa(s) is a’s data base in s
• clsa : 2M → 2M designate a data-mining operator such that clsa(D) :=
cla(msgsa(s) ∪ D) :=
⋃
n∈N cl
n
a(msgsa(s) ∪ D), where for all D ⊆M:
cl0a(D) := {a} ∪ D
cln+1a (D) := clna(D) ∪
{ (M,M ′) | {M,M ′} ⊆ clna(D) } ∪ (pairing)
{ M,M ′ | (M,M ′) ∈ clna(D) } ∪ (unpairing)
{ {[M ]}a | M ∈ clna(D) } ∪ (personal signature synthesis)
{ (M, b) | {[M ]}b ∈ clna(D) } (universal signature analysis)
• <Ma ⊆ S × S designate a data preorder on states such that for all s, s′ ∈ S,
s <Ma s
′ :iff clsa({M}) = cls
′
a (∅), were M can be viewed as oracle input in ad-
dition to a’s individual-knowledge base clsa(∅) (cf. also [Kra12a, Section 2.2])
• <MC := (
⋃
a∈C <
M
a )
++, where ‘++’ designates the closure operation of so-
called generalised transitivity in the sense that <MC ◦<M
′
C ⊆ <(M,M
′)
C
• ≡a := <aa designate an equivalence relation of state indistinguishability
• MRCa ⊆ S × S designate a concretely constructed accessibility relation—
short, concrete accessibility—for the non-monotonic proof modality of LiiP
such that for all s, s′ ∈ S,
s MR
C
a s
′ :iff s′ ∈
⋃
s <MC∪{a} s˜ and
M ∈ cls˜a(∅)
[s˜]≡a
(iff there is s˜ ∈ S s.t. s <MC∪{a} s˜ and M ∈ cls˜a(∅) and s˜ ≡a s′).
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2. If cla is polynomial-time computable then so is σ
M
a (and thus MRa).
Proof. Clearly, if cla is computable then σ
M
a is computable, and similarly for
2.
In particular when cla = id2M , that is, when cla is the identity function on 2
M
(a performs no data-mining operations), MRa is polynomial-time computable.
Fact 4. For σMa , fix cla as in Table 1. Then:
1. for all s ∈ S, s MRCa σMa (s) ;
2. MRa ⊆ MR∅a (and MR∅a ⊆ MRCa [Kra13, Kra12c]).
Proof. Fix cla as in Table 1. For 1, consider that s <
M
a σ
M
a (s) and thus s <
M
C∪{a}
σMa (s), M ∈ clσ
M
a (s)
a (∅), and σMa (s) ≡a σMa (s) in Table 1. Hence there is s˜ ∈ S
such that s <MC∪{a} s˜ and M ∈ cls˜a(∅) and s˜ ≡a σMa (s). (In reverse, σMa can be
used as a Skolem-function for the existential quantifier in the previous statement
and thus in the definiens of MR
C
a in Table 1.) For 2, inspect 1 and definitions.
Hence we have indeed found in σMa an instance of an f for MR
C
a whose existence
AC[MR
C
a ] postulates and thus indeed constructed a functional totally defined
sub-relation MRa of MR
C
a—from MR
C
a itself (as a Skolemnisation of its definiens).
However notice that we have lost C in MRa (non-communality), because σMa
simply disregards C. This is the price for the functionality of MRa. Actually,
MRa (for LDiiP) is a functional analog of <
M
a (for LiiP, see Table 1). And
it is impossible to construct a functional analog of MR
C
a from a union of MRa
over C, because such a union of functions need not be a function anymore.
In contrast, it is possible to construct a functional analog of MR
C
a from an
intersection of MRa over C, since such an intersection of functions is again a
function. Yet unfortunately it then need not be total anymore! We can thus
assert the following negative fact about our negation-complete proofs.
Fact 5. Negation-completeness implies non-communality.
This fact could be useful to establish the theoretical and thus also practical
impossibility of engineering social procedures [PP06] for which negation com-
pleteness would be a necessary condition. Due to the same fact, there is no
community parameter C in ‘Ya ’ and, in particular, no LDiiP-analog of the
LiiP-axiom
`LiiP (M ::C∪C′a φ)→M ::Ca φ (see [Kra13, Kra12c]).
Note that if we were to mix LiiP- and LDiiP-modalities in a single logic, the for-
mula (M ::∅a φ)→M Ya φ would be a sound axiom in that logic due to Fact 4.2.
Proposition 2.
1. there is s′ ∈ S such that s MRa s′ (seriality/totality)
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Table 2: Satisfaction relation
(S,V), s |= P :iff s ∈ V(P )
(S,V), s |= ¬φ :iff not (S,V), s |= φ
(S,V), s |= φ ∧ φ′ :iff (S,V), s |= φ and (S,V), s |= φ′
(S,V), s |= M Ya φ :iff for all s′ ∈ S, if s MRa s′ then (S,V), s′ |= φ
2. if s MRa s
′ and s MRa s
′′ then s′ = s′′ (determinism/functionality)
3. if M ∈ clsa(∅) then s MRa s (conditional reflexivity)
4. if s MRa s
′ then M ∈ cls′a (∅) (epistemic image)
Proof. By inspection of definitions. (For 4, consider that M ∈ clsuccMa (s)a (∅).)
2.2.2 Abstractly
We now continue to present the abstract semantic interface for LDiiP, and prove
the axiomatic adequacy of the proof system with respect to this interface.
Definition 4 (Kripke-model). We define the satisfaction relation ‘ |=’ for LDiiP
in Table 2, where
• V : P → 2S designates a usual valuation function, yet partially predefined
such that for all a ∈ A and M ∈M,
V(a kM) := { s ∈ S | M ∈ clsa(∅) }
for S assumed abstract (and thus general) like in Table 1 and clsa like in
Definition 3 but with msgsa abstract (and thus general) like in Table 1
• S := (S, {MRa}M∈M,a∈A) designates a (modal) frame for LDiiP with an
abstractly constrained accessibility relation—short, abstract accessi-
bility—MRa ⊆ S×S for the negation-complete disjunctive proof modality
such that—the semantic interface:
– there is s′ ∈ S such that s MRa s′ (seriality/totality)
– if s MRa s′ and s MRa s′′ then s′ = s′′ (determinism/functionality)
– if M ∈ clsa(∅) then s MRa s (conditional reflexivity)
– if s MRa s′ then M ∈ cls
′
a (∅) (epistemic image)
• (S,V) designates a (modal) model for LDiiP.
Looking back, we recognise that Proposition 2 actually establishes the im-
portant fact that our concrete accessibility MRa in Definition 3 realises all the
properties stipulated by our abstract accessibility MRa in Definition 4; we say
that
MRa exemplifies (or realises) MRa.
16
Theorem 3 (Axiomatic adequacy). `LDiiP is adequate for |=, i.e.,:
1. if `LDiiP φ then |= φ (axiomatic soundness)
2. if |= φ then `LDiiP φ (semantic completeness).
Proof. Both parts can be proved with standard means: soundness follows as
usual from the admissibility of the axioms and rules (cf. Appendix A.4.1);
and completeness follows by means of the classical construction of canonical
models, using Lindenbaum’s construction of maximally consistent sets (cf. Ap-
pendix A.4.2).
Theorem 4 (Finite-model property). For any LDiiP-model M, if M, s |= φ
then there is a finite LDiiP-model Mfin such that Mfin, s |= φ.
Proof. By the fact that the minimal filtration [GO07]
Mmin,Γflt := (S/∼Γ , {MRmin,Γa }M∈M,a∈A,VΓ)
of any LDiiP-model M := (S, {MRa}M∈M,a∈A,V) through a finite Γ ⊆ L
is a finite LDiiP-model such that for all γ ∈ Γ, M, s |= γ if and only if
Mmin,Γflt , [s]∼Γ |= γ. Following [GO07] for our setting, we define
∼Γ := { (s, s′) ∈ S × S | for all γ ∈ Γ, M, s |= γ iff M, s′ |= γ }
MRmin,Γa := { ([s]∼Γ , [s′]∼Γ) | (s, s′) ∈ MRa }
VΓ(P ) := { [s]∼Γ | s ∈ V(P ) } .
We further fix M ∈ cl[s]∼Γa (∅) :iff [s]∼Γ ∈ VΓ(a kM), and choose Γ to be the
(finite) sub-formula closure of φ. Hence, we are left to prove that Mmin,Γflt is
indeed an LDiiP-model, which means that we are left to prove that MRmin,Γa
has all the properties stipulated by the semantic interface of LDiiP:
• MRmin,Γa inherits seriality/totality as well as determinism/functionality
from MRa, as can be seen by inspecting the definition of MRmin,Γa ;
• for conditional reflexivity, suppose that M ∈ cl[s]∼Γa (∅). Thus consec-
utively: [s]∼Γ ∈ VΓ(a kM) by definition, s ∈ V(a kM) by definition,
M ∈ clsa(∅) by definition, s MRa s by the conditional reflexivity of MRa,
and finally [s]∼Γ MRmin,Γa [s]∼Γ by definition;
• for the epistemic-image property, suppose that [s]∼Γ MRmin,Γa [s′]∼Γ . Thus
consecutively: s MRa s′ by definition, M ∈ cls
′
a (∅) by the epistemic-
image property of MRa, s′ ∈ V(a kM) by definition, [s′]∼Γ ∈ VΓ(a kM)
by definition, and finally M ∈ cl[s
′]∼Γ
a (∅) by definition.
Corollary 4 (Algorithmic decidability). If the sub-theory generated by Γ1 (cf.
Definition 2) is algorithmically decidable then LDiiP (over Γ1) is so too.
17
Proof. In order to algorithmically decide whether or not φ ∈ LDiiP (that is,
`LDiiP φ), axiomatic adequacy allows us to check whether or not ¬φ is locally
satisfiable (that is, whether or notM, s |= ¬φ for some LDiiP-modelM and state
s; by assumption, M ∈ clsa(∅), modelling membership in the theory generated
by Γ1, is decidable.). But then, the finite-model property of LDiiP allows us to
enumerate all finite LDiiP-models Mfin up to a size of at most 2 to the power
of the size n of the sub-formula closure of ¬φ and to check whether or not
Mfin, s |= ¬φ. (There are at most 2n equivalence classes for n formulas.)
So in some sense, we have proved the algorithmic decidability of the epis-
temic decisiveness of the evidence terms in LDiiP. Note that the algorithmic
complexity of LDiiP will depend on the specific choice of Γ1 in Definition 2.
3 Conclusion
We have produced LDiiP from LiiP with as main contributions those described
in Section 1.2. In future work, we shall work out dynamic and first-order ex-
tensions of LDiiP as well as the preliminary case study [KR10] mentioned in
Section 1.1.2.
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A Remaining proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose that T is a classical logical theory with language L (i.e., for all φ ∈ L,
`T φ ∨ ¬φ).
• For the if-direction, suppose that for all φ ∈ L, `T φ or `T ¬φ, and let
φ, φ′ ∈ L. Thus `T φ or `T ¬φ. Let us proceed by case analysis of this
disjunction:
– So first suppose that `T φ. Hence `T φ or `T φ′ (from A infer
A or B), and thus `T φ ∨ φ′ (vacously) implies `T φ or `T φ′ (from
A or B infer C implies A or B).
– Now suppose that `T ¬φ. Further suppose that `T φ ∨ φ′ (that is,
C). Hence `T φ′ (that is, B), and thus `T φ or `T φ′ (from B infer
A or B). (Thus inferring C implies A or B.)
• For the only-if direction, suppose that for all φ, φ′ ∈ L, `T φ ∨ φ′ implies
`T φ or `T φ′, and let φ ∈ L. Hence `T φ ∨ ¬φ implies `T φ or `T ¬φ
(particularising the universally quantified φ′ with ¬φ). Hence `T φ or
`T ¬φ, since we have initially supposed T to be classical.
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(See also [DP02].)
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
1. (a) `LDiiP (M Ya φ)→ (a kM → φ) epistemic truthfulness
(b) `LDiiP a kM → ((M Ya φ)→ φ) a, PL
(c) `LDiiP (M Ya (a kM))→M Ya ((M Ya φ)→ φ) b, regularity
(d) `LDiiP M Ya a kM self-knowledge
(e) `LDiiP M Ya ((M Ya φ)→ φ) c, d, PL.
2. (a) `LDiiP M Ya ((M Ya φ)→ φ) Lemma 1.1
(b) `LDiiP (M Ya ((M Ya φ)→ φ))→ ((M Ya (M Ya φ))→M Ya φ) K
(c) `LDiiP (M Ya (M Ya φ))→M Ya φ a, b, PL.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
1. (a) `LDiiP ¬(M Ya⊥) proof consistency
(b) `LDiiP ¬(M Ya⊥)↔ ((M Ya φ)→ ¬(M Ya ¬φ)) Fact 2
(c) `LDiiP (M Ya φ)→ ¬(M Ya ¬φ) a, b, PL
(d) `LDiiP (M Ya ¬φ)→ ¬(M Ya φ) c, PL
(e) `LDiiP (M Ya φ) ∨M Ya ¬φ negation completeness
(f) `LDiiP ¬(M Ya φ)→M Ya ¬φ e, PL
(g) `LDiiP (M Ya ¬φ)↔ ¬(M Ya φ) d, f, PL.
2. (a) `LDiiP φ→ (φ′ → (φ ∧ φ′)) tautology
(b) `LDiiP (M Ya φ)→M Ya (φ′ → (φ ∧ φ′)) a, regularity
(c) `LDiiP (M Ya (φ′ → (φ ∧ φ′)))→ ((M Ya φ′)→M Ya (φ ∧ φ′)) K
(d) `LDiiP (M Ya φ)→ ((M Ya φ′)→M Ya (φ ∧ φ′)) b, c, PL
(e) `LDiiP ((M Ya φ) ∧M Ya φ′)→M Ya (φ ∧ φ′) d, PL
(f) `LDiiP (φ ∧ φ′)→ φ tautology
(g) `LDiiP (M Ya (φ ∧ φ′))→M Ya φ f, regularity
(h) `LDiiP (φ ∧ φ′)→ φ′ tautology
(i) `LDiiP (M Ya (φ ∧ φ′))→M Ya φ′ h, regularity
(j) `LDiiP (M Ya (φ ∧ φ′))→ ((M Ya φ) ∧M Ya φ′) g, i, PL
(k) `LDiiP ((M Ya φ) ∧M Ya φ′)↔M Ya (φ ∧ φ′) e, j, PL.
3. (a) `LDiiP (M Ya (φ ∨ φ′))↔M Ya ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬φ′) definition
(b) `LDiiP (M Ya ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬φ′))↔ ¬(M Ya (¬φ ∧ ¬φ′)) Theorem 2.1
(c) `LDiiP (M Ya (φ ∨ φ′))↔ ¬(M Ya (¬φ ∧ ¬φ′)) a, b, PL
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(d) `LDiiP (M Ya (¬φ ∧ ¬φ′))↔ ((M Ya ¬φ) ∧M Ya ¬φ′) Theorem 2.2
(e) `LDiiP ¬(M Ya (¬φ ∧ ¬φ′))↔ ¬((M Ya ¬φ) ∧M Ya ¬φ′) d, PL
(f) `LDiiP (M Ya (φ ∨ φ′))↔ ¬((M Ya ¬φ) ∧M Ya ¬φ′) c, e, PL
(g) `LDiiP ¬((M Ya ¬φ) ∧M Ya ¬φ′)↔ (¬(M Ya ¬φ) ∨ ¬(M Ya ¬φ′)) PL
(h) `LDiiP (M Ya (φ ∨ φ′))↔ (¬(M Ya ¬φ) ∨ ¬(M Ya ¬φ′)) f, g, PL
(i) `LDiiP (M Ya ¬φ)↔ ¬(M Ya φ) Theorem 2.1
(j) `LDiiP ¬(M Ya ¬φ)↔ (M Ya φ) i, PL
(k) `LDiiP (M Ya ¬φ′)↔ ¬(M Ya φ′) Theorem 2.1
(l) `LDiiP ¬(M Ya ¬φ′)↔ (M Ya φ′) k, PL
(m) `LDiiP (M Ya (φ ∨ φ′))↔ ((M Ya φ) ∨M Ya φ′) h, j, l, PL.
4. (a) `LDiiP ((M Ya φ)→M Ya φ′)↔ (¬(M Ya φ) ∨M Ya φ′) definition
(b) `LDiiP (M Ya ¬φ)↔ ¬(M Ya φ) Theorem 2.1
(c) `LDiiP ((M Ya φ)→M Ya φ′)↔ ((M Ya ¬φ) ∨M Ya φ′) a, b, PL
(d) `LDiiP (M Ya (¬φ ∨ φ′))↔ ((M Ya ¬φ) ∨M Ya φ′) Theorem 2.3
(e) `LDiiP ((M Ya φ)→M Ya φ′)↔M Ya (¬φ ∨ φ′) c, d, PL
(f) `LDiiP ((M Ya φ)→M Ya φ′)↔M Ya (φ→ φ′) e, definition.
5. by Theorem 2.2 and 2.4.
6. (a) `LDiiP (M Ya (M Ya φ))→M Ya φ Lemma 1.2
(b) `LDiiP (M Ya (M Ya ¬φ))→M Ya ¬φ Lemma 1.2
(c) `LDiiP ¬(M Ya ¬φ)→ ¬(M Ya (M Ya ¬φ)) b, PL
(d) `LDiiP (M Ya ¬φ)↔ ¬(M Ya φ) Theorem 2.1
(e) `LDiiP ¬(M Ya ¬φ)↔ (M Ya φ) d, PL
(f) `LDiiP (M Ya φ)→ ¬(M Ya (M Ya ¬φ)) c, e, PL
(g) `LDiiP (M Ya (M Ya ¬φ))↔M Ya ¬(M Ya φ) d, regularity
(h) `LDiiP ¬(M Ya (M Ya ¬φ))↔ ¬(M Ya ¬(M Ya φ)) g, PL
(i) `LDiiP (M Ya φ)→ ¬(M Ya ¬(M Ya φ)) f, h, PL
(j) `LDiiP (M Ya ¬(M Ya φ))↔ ¬(M Ya (M Ya φ)) Theorem 2.1
(k) `LDiiP ¬(M Ya ¬(M Ya φ))↔M Ya (M Ya φ) j, PL
(l) `LDiiP (M Ya φ)→M Ya (M Ya φ) i, k, PL; (proof transitivity)
(m) `LDiiP (M Ya (M Ya φ))↔M Ya φ a, l, PL.
7. (a) `LDiiP b kM → ((M Yb (M Ya φ))→M Ya φ) epistemic truthfulness,
PL
(b) `LDiiP b kM → ((M Yb (M Ya ¬φ))→M Ya ¬φ) dito a
(c) `LDiiP b kM → (¬(M Ya ¬φ)→ ¬(M Yb (M Ya ¬φ))) b, PL
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(d) `LDiiP (M Ya ¬φ)↔ ¬(M Ya φ) Theorem 2.1
(e) `LDiiP ¬(M Ya ¬φ)↔ (M Ya φ) d, PL
(f) `LDiiP b kM → ((M Ya φ)→ ¬(M Yb (M Ya ¬φ))) c, e, PL
(g) `LDiiP (M Yb (M Ya ¬φ))↔M Yb ¬(M Ya φ) d, regularity
(h) `LDiiP ¬(M Yb (M Ya ¬φ))↔ ¬(M Yb ¬(M Ya φ)) g, PL
(i) `LDiiP b kM → ((M Ya φ)→ ¬(M Yb ¬(M Ya φ))) f, h, PL
(j) `LDiiP (M Yb ¬(M Ya φ))↔ ¬(M Yb (M Ya φ)) Theorem 2.1
(k) `LDiiP ¬(M Yb ¬(M Ya φ))↔M Yb (M Ya φ) j, PL
(l) `LDiiP b kM → ((M Ya φ)→M Yb (M Ya φ)) i, k, PL
(m) `LDiiP b kM → ((M Yb (M Ya φ))↔M Ya φ) a, l, PL.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
A.4.1 Axiomatic soundness
Definition 5 (Truth & Validity [BvB07]).
• The formula φ ∈ L is true (or satisfied) in the model (S,V) at the state
s ∈ S :iff (S,V), s |= φ.
• The formula φ is satisfiable in the model (S,V) :iff there is s ∈ S such
that (S,V), s |= φ.
• The formula φ is globally true (or globally satisfied) in the model (S,V),
written (S,V) |= φ, :iff for all s ∈ S, (S,V), s |= φ.
• The formula φ is satisfiable :iff there is a model (S,V) and a state s ∈ S
such that (S,V), s |= φ.
• The formula φ is valid, written |= φ, :iff for all models (S,V), (S,V) |= φ.
Proposition 3 (Admissibility of LDiiP-specific axioms and rules).
1. |= M Ya a kM
2. |= (M Ya (φ→ φ′))→ ((M Ya φ)→M Ya φ′)
3. |= (M Ya φ)→ (a kM → φ)
4. |= ¬(M Ya⊥)
5. |= (M Ya φ) ∨M Ya ¬φ
6. If |= φ then |= M Ya φ
Proof. 1 follows directly from the epistemic-image property of MRa; 2 and 6
hold by the fact that LiiP has a standard Kripke-semantics; 3 follows directly
from the conditional reflexivity of MRa, and 4 and 5 from the seriality/totality
and the determinism/functionality of MRa, respectively.
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A.4.2 Semantic completeness
For all φ ∈ L, if |= φ then `LDiiP φ.
Proof. Let
• W designate the set of all maximally LDiiP-consistent sets7
• for all w,w′ ∈ W, w MCa w′ :iff { φ ∈ L | M Ya φ ∈ w } ⊆ w′
• for all w ∈ W, w ∈ VC(P ) :iff P ∈ w.
Then MC := (W, {MCa}M∈M,a∈A,VC) designates the canonical model for
LDiiP. Following Fitting [Fit07a, Section 2.2], the following useful property of
MC,
for all φ ∈ L and w ∈ W, φ ∈ w if and only if MC, w |= φ,
the so-called Truth Lemma, can be proved by induction on the structure of φ:
1. Base case (φ := P for P ∈ P). For all w ∈ W, P ∈ w if and only if
MC, w |= P , by definition of VC.
2. Inductive step (φ := ¬φ′ for φ′ ∈ L). Suppose that for all w ∈ W, φ′ ∈ w
if and only if MC, w |= φ′. Further let w ∈ W. Then, ¬φ′ ∈ w if and
only if φ′ 6∈ w — w is consistent — if and only if MC, w 6|= φ′ — by the
induction hypothesis — if and only if MC, w |= ¬φ′.
3. Inductive step (φ := φ′ ∧ φ′′ for φ′, φ′′ ∈ L). Suppose that for all w ∈ W,
φ′ ∈ w if and only if MC, w |= φ′, and that for all w ∈ W, φ′′ ∈ w if
and only if MC, w |= φ′′. Further let w ∈ W. Then, φ′ ∧ φ′′ ∈ w if
and only if (φ′ ∈ w and φ′′ ∈ w), because w is maximal. Now suppose
that φ′ ∈ w and φ′′ ∈ w. Hence, MC, w |= φ′ and MC, w |= φ′′, by the
induction hypotheses, and thusMC, w |= φ′∧φ′′. Conversely, suppose that
MC, w |= φ′∧φ′′. Then, MC, w |= φ′ and MC, w |= φ′′. Hence, φ′ ∈ w and
φ′′ ∈ w, by the induction hypotheses. Thus, (φ′ ∈ w and φ′′ ∈ w) if and
only if (MC, w |= φ′ and MC, w |= φ′′). Whence φ′ ∧ φ′′ ∈ w if and only if
(MC, w |= φ′ and MC, w |= φ′′), by transitivity.
4. Inductive step (φ := M Ya φ′ for M ∈M, a ∈ A, and φ′ ∈ L).
7* A set W of LDiiP-formulas is maximally LDiiP-consistent :iff W is LDiiP-consistent
and W has no proper superset that is LDiiP-consistent. A set W of LDiiP-formulas is LDiiP-
consistent :iff W is not LDiiP-inconsistent. A set W of LDiiP-formulas is LDiiP-inconsistent
:iff there is a finite W ′ ⊆ W such that ((∧W ′) → ⊥) ∈ LDiiP. Any LDiiP-consistent set
can be extended to a maximally LDiiP-consistent set by means of the Lindenbaum Con-
struction [Fit07a, Page 90]. A set is maximally LDiiP-consistent if and only if the set of
logical-equivalence classes of the set is an ultrafilter of the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of
LDiiP [Ven07, Page 351]. The canonical frame is isomorphic to the ultrafilter frame of that
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra [Ven07, Page 352].
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4.1 for all w ∈ W, φ′ ∈ w if and only if MC, w |= φ′ ind. hyp.
4.2 w ∈ W hyp.
4.3 M Ya φ′ ∈ w hyp.
4.4 w′ ∈ W hyp.
4.5 w MCa w
′ hyp.
4.6 { φ′′ ∈ L | M Ya φ′′ ∈ w } ⊆ w′ 4.5
4.7 φ′ ∈ { φ′′ ∈ L | M Ya φ′′ ∈ w } 4.3, 4.6
4.8 φ′ ∈ w′ 4.6, 4.7
4.9 MC, w
′ |= φ′ 4.1, 4.4, 4.8
4.10 if w MCa w
′ then MC, w′ |= φ′ 4.5–4.9
4.11 for all w′ ∈ W, if w MCa w′ then MC, w′ |= φ′ 4.4–4.10
4.12 MC, w |= M Ya φ′ 4.11
4.13 M Ya φ′ 6∈ w hyp.
4.14 F = { φ′′ ∈ L | M Ya φ′′ ∈ w } ∪ {¬φ′} hyp.
4.15 F is LDiiP-inconsistent hyp.
4.16 there is {M Ya φ1, . . . ,M Ya φn} ⊆ w such that
`LDiiP (φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn ∧ ¬φ′)→ ⊥ 4.14, 4.15
4.17 {M Ya φ1, . . . ,M Ya φn} ⊆ w and
`LDiiP (φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn ∧ ¬φ′)→ ⊥ hyp.
4.18 `LDiiP (φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn)→ φ′ 4.17
4.19 `LDiiP (M Ya (φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn))→M Ya φ′ 4.18, regularity
4.20 `LDiiP ((M Ya φ1) ∧ . . . ∧ (M Ya φn))→M Ya φ′ 4.19
4.21 M Ya φ′ ∈ w 4.17, 4.20, w is maximal
4.22 false 4.13, 4.21
4.23 false 4.16, 4.17–4.22
4.24 F is LDiiP-consistent 4.15–4.23
4.25 there is w′ ⊇ F s.t. w′ is maximally LDiiP-consistent 4.24
4.26 F ⊆ w′ and w′ is maximally LDiiP-consistent hyp.
4.27 { φ′′ ∈ L | M Ya φ′′ ∈ w } ⊆ F 4.14
4.28 { φ′′ ∈ L | M Ya φ′′ ∈ w } ⊆ w′ 4.26, 4.27
4.29 w MCa w
′ 4.28
4.30 w′ ∈ W 4.26
4.31 ¬φ′ ∈ F 4.14
4.32 ¬φ′ ∈ w′ 4.26, 4.31
4.33 φ′ 6∈ w′ 4.26 (w′ is LDiiP-consistent), 4.32
4.34 MC, w
′ 6|= φ′ 4.1, 4.33
4.35 there is w′ ∈ W s.t. w MCa w′ and MC, w′ 6|= φ′ 4.29, 4.34
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4.36 MC, w 6|= M Ya φ′ 4.35
4.37 MC, w 6|= M Ya φ′ 4.25, 4.26–4.36
4.38 MC, w 6|= M Ya φ′ 4.14–4.37
4.39 M Ya φ′ ∈ w if and only if MC, w |= M Ya φ′ 4.3–4.12, 4.13–4.38
4.40 for all w ∈ W, M Ya φ′ ∈ w if and only if MC, w |= M Ya φ′4.2–4.39
With the Truth Lemma we can now prove that for all φ ∈ L, if 6`LDiiP φ then
6|= φ. Let φ ∈ L, and suppose that 6`LDiiP φ. Thus, {¬φ} is LDiiP-consistent,
and can be extended to a maximally LDiiP-consistent set w, i.e., ¬φ ∈ w ∈ W.
Hence MC, w |= ¬φ, by the Truth Lemma. Thus: MC, w 6|= φ, MC 6|= φ, and
6|= φ. That is, MC is a universal (for all φ ∈ L) counter-model (if φ is a
non-theorem then MC falsifies φ).
We are left to prove that MC is also an LDiiP-model. So let us instantiate
our data mining operator cla (cf. Page 14) on W by letting for all w ∈ W
msgsa(w) := { M | a kM ∈ w },
and let us prove that:
1. there is w′ ∈ W such that w MCa w′
2. if w MCa w
′ and w MCa w
′′ then w′ = w′′
3. if M ∈ clwa (∅) then w MCa w
4. if w MCa w
′ then M ∈ clw′a (∅).
For (1), let w ∈ W and φ ∈ L, and suppose that M Ya φ ∈ w. For the
sake of deriving the contrary, further suppose that φ 6∈ w. Hence ¬φ ∈ w
because w is maximal, and thus φ→ ⊥ ∈ w. Hence (M Ya φ)→M Ya⊥ ∈ w by
regularity. Hence M Ya⊥ ∈ w by the first supposition and modus ponens. Hence
¬(M Ya⊥) 6∈ w because w is consistent. Yet since w is maximal, ¬(M Ya⊥) ∈ w
(proof consistency). Contradiction. Hence w is actually a w′ such that φ ∈ w′.
For (2), let us first prove the following, so-called Reflection Lemma:
M Ya φ 6∈ w if and only if M Ya ¬φ ∈ w.
So suppose that
• M Ya φ 6∈ w. Hence ¬(M Ya φ) ∈ w because w is maximal. Since w is
maximal, ¬(M Ya φ) → M Ya ¬φ ∈ w (negation completeness). Hence
M Ya ¬φ ∈ w by modus ponens.
• M Ya ¬φ ∈ w. Since w is maximal, (M Ya ¬φ) → ¬(M Ya ¬¬φ) ∈ w
(proof consistency). Hence ¬(M Ya ¬¬φ) ∈ w by modus ponens. Since
w is maximal, φ → ¬¬φ ∈ w. Hence (M Ya φ) → M Ya ¬¬φ ∈ w by
regularity. Hence ¬(M Ya ¬¬φ) → ¬(M Ya φ) ∈ w by contraposition.
Hence ¬(M Ya φ) ∈ w by modus ponens. Hence M Ya φ 6∈ w because w is
consistent.
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Now for (2), let w,w′, w′′ ∈ W and suppose that w MCa w′ and w MCa w′′.
That is, (for all φ ∈ L, if M Ya φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w′) and (for all φ ∈ L, if
M Ya φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w′′). Now let φ ∈ L and suppose that
• φ ∈ w′. Hence ¬φ 6∈ w′ because w is consistent. Hence M Ya ¬φ 6∈ w
by particularisation of the first supposition with ¬φ and modus tollens.
Hence M Ya φ ∈ w by the Reflection Lemma. Hence φ ∈ w′′ by the second
supposition and modus ponens.
• φ ∈ w′′. Hence φ ∈ w′—symmetrically.
For (3), let w ∈ W and suppose that M ∈ clwa (∅). Hence a kM ∈ w due to
the maximality of w. Further suppose that M Ya φ ∈ w. Since w is maximal,
(M Ya φ)→ (a kM → φ) ∈ w (epistemic truthfulness).
Hence, a kM → φ ∈ w, and φ ∈ w, by consecutive modus ponens.
For (4), let w,w′ ∈ W and suppose that w MCa w′. That is, for all φ ∈ L, if
M Ya φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w′. Since w is maximal,
M Ya a kM ∈ w (self-knowledge).
Hence a kM ∈ w′ by particularisation of the supposition, and thus M ∈ clw′a (∅)
by the definition of clw
′
a .
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